

OCT 15 1963

Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA

STATINTL

COLD WAR OUTLOOK

(Mr. BARRY (at the request of Mr. HARRISON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BARRY. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Allen Dulles, the former Director of Central Intelligence, continues to take an interest in international affairs. To his everlasting credit, he is devoting his retirement years to giving fellow Americans the benefit of lessons learned during a lifetime of service to his country.

Mr. Dulles has written an article for the October 1963 issue of Nation's Business entitled, "Cold War Outlook." Because of Mr. Dulles' unique background, this article is of importance. I recommend it to all of my colleagues who have an interest in international affairs.

I will not attempt to quote the entire article. However, one section of the article struck me as having significance because of the current state of Soviet-American relations. The section to which I refer deals with the possibilities of agreements with the Soviet Union. Mr. Dulles is very careful to point out the pitfalls of dealing with the Soviets. He suggests seven guidelines in dealing with the Russians. I quote:

It is not easy to draw up clear specifications as to what type or types of agreements can safely and profitably be entered into with the representatives of the Soviet Union with its Communist principles and its Communist ambitions. Here are some possible guideposts:

1. The agreement should be executory in character and the actions under it should be so timed as to be simultaneously carried out; that is, to say, neither party should modify its position to its possible disadvantage until the other party has acted likewise. (Example: Austrian State Treaty.)

2. The agreement should not depend upon unilateral action on our side against the promise of some future action by the Soviets.

3. The execution of the agreement should be self-policing or self-evident (as most experts tell us is the case with the test ban treaty).

4. The agreement should not be subject to misconstruction due to any possible difference of interpretation of its terms. (Our postwar agreements with the Soviets providing for free elections are examples. Here we found that this meant to them freedom to vote solely for Communist candidates.)

5. The agreement should be as clear, precise, and comprehensive as the subject matter requires. (In the original 1945 agreement on allied access to Berlin, too much latitude was left to those who later had to interpret it.)

6. Gentlemen's agreements, which are usually vague in content and uncertain in performance, should never be relied upon in our dealings with the Soviets. (The test ban agreement which Khrushchey broke in 1961 is an example.)

7. Any agreements which tend to open up the barrier of the Iron Curtain to freer intercourse, fuller exchanges of ideas, of culture, and information should be encouraged. We have little to fear ourselves from what they in peacetime may send to us, except for their spies, whom they can and will send us anyway.